Added flag to prohibit renegotiations.

[BearSSL] / src / ssl / ssl_hs_common.t0

\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
\
\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
\ the following conditions:
\
\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
\
\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
\ SOFTWARE.

\ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
\ This is the common T0 code for processing handshake messages (code that
\ is used by both client and server).

preamble {

#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>

#include "inner.h"

/*
 * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the current engine context.
 */
#define ENG  ((br_ssl_engine_context *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, cpu)))

}

\ IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
\ ====================
\
\ This code handles all records except application data records.
\ Application data is accepted (incoming records, outgoing payload data)
\ only when the application_data flag is set, which is done at the end
\ of the handshake; and it is cleared whenever a renegotiation or a
\ closure takes place.
\
\ Incoming alerts are processed on the fly; fatal alerts terminate the
\ context, while warnings are ignored, except for close_notify, which
\ triggers the closure procedure. That procedure never returns (it ends
\ with an 'ERR_OK fail' call). We can thus make this processing right
\ into the read functions.
\
\ Specific actions from the caller (closure or renegotiation) may happen
\ only when jumping back into the T0 code, i.e. just after a 'co' call.
\ Similarly, incoming record type may change only while the caller has
\ control, so we need to check that type only when returning from a 'co'.
\
\ The handshake processor needs to defer back to the caller ('co') only
\ in one of the following situations:
\
\ -- Some handshake data is expected.
\
\ -- The handshake is finished, and application data may flow. There may
\    be some incoming handshake data (HelloRequest from the server). This
\    is the only situation where a renegotiation call won't be ignored.
\
\ -- Some change-cipher-spec data is expected.
\
\ -- An alert record is expected. Other types of incoming records will be
\    skipped.
\
\ -- Waiting for the currently accumulated record to be sent and the
\    output buffer to become free again for another record.

\ Placeholder for handling not yet implemented functionalities.
: NYI ( -- ! )
        "NOT YET IMPLEMENTED!" puts cr -1 fail ;

\ Mark the context as failed with a specific error code. This also
\ returns control to the caller.
cc: fail ( err -- ! ) {
        br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, (int)T0_POPi());
        T0_CO();
}

\ Read a byte from the context (address is offset in context).
cc: get8 ( addr -- val ) {
        size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
        T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
}

\ Read a 16-bit word from the context (address is offset in context).
cc: get16 ( addr -- val ) {
        size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
        T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
}

\ Read a 32-bit word from the context (address is offset in context).
cc: get32 ( addr -- val ) {
        size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
        T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
}

\ Set a byte in the context (address is offset in context).
cc: set8 ( val addr -- ) {
        size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
        *((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
}

\ Set a 16-bit word in the context (address is offset in context).
cc: set16 ( val addr -- ) {
        size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
        *(uint16_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint16_t)T0_POP();
}

\ Set a 32-bit word in the context (address is offset in context).
cc: set32 ( val addr -- ) {
        size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
        *(uint32_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint32_t)T0_POP();
}

\ Define a word that evaluates as an address of a field within the
\ engine context. The field name (C identifier) must follow in the
\ source. For field 'foo', the defined word is 'addr-foo'.
: addr-eng:
        next-word { field }
        "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
        0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
        postpone literal postpone ; ;

addr-eng: max_frag_len
addr-eng: log_max_frag_len
addr-eng: peer_log_max_frag_len
addr-eng: shutdown_recv
addr-eng: record_type_in
addr-eng: record_type_out
addr-eng: version_in
addr-eng: version_out
addr-eng: application_data
addr-eng: version_min
addr-eng: version_max
addr-eng: suites_buf
addr-eng: suites_num
addr-eng: server_name
\ addr-eng: version
\ addr-eng: cipher_suite
addr-eng: client_random
addr-eng: server_random
\ addr-eng: session_id_len
\ addr-eng: session_id
addr-eng: ecdhe_curve
addr-eng: ecdhe_point
addr-eng: ecdhe_point_len
addr-eng: reneg
addr-eng: saved_finished
addr-eng: flags
addr-eng: pad
addr-eng: action
addr-eng: alert
addr-eng: close_received

\ Similar to 'addr-eng:', for fields in the 'session' substructure.
: addr-session-field:
        next-word { field }
        "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
        0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, " field + ")" + make-CX
        postpone literal postpone ; ;

addr-session-field: session_id
addr-session-field: session_id_len
addr-session-field: version
addr-session-field: cipher_suite
addr-session-field: master_secret

\ Check a server flag by index.
: flag? ( index -- bool )
        addr-flags get32 swap >> 1 and neg ;

\ Define a word that evaluates to an error constant. This assumes that
\ all relevant error codes are in the 0..63 range.
: err:
        next-word { name }
        name 0 1 define-word
        0 63 "BR_" name + make-CX postpone literal postpone ; ;

err: ERR_OK
err: ERR_BAD_PARAM
err: ERR_BAD_STATE
err: ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION
err: ERR_BAD_VERSION
err: ERR_BAD_LENGTH
err: ERR_TOO_LARGE
err: ERR_BAD_MAC
err: ERR_NO_RANDOM
err: ERR_UNKNOWN_TYPE
err: ERR_UNEXPECTED
err: ERR_BAD_CCS
err: ERR_BAD_ALERT
err: ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE
err: ERR_OVERSIZED_ID
err: ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE
err: ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION
err: ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN
err: ERR_BAD_SECRENEG
err: ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION
err: ERR_BAD_SNI
err: ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE
err: ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED
err: ERR_BAD_FINISHED
err: ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH
err: ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM

\ Get supported curves (bit mask).
cc: supported-curves ( -- x ) {
        uint32_t x = ENG->iec == NULL ? 0 : ENG->iec->supported_curves;
        T0_PUSH(x);
}

\ Get supported hash functions (bit mask and number).
cc: supported-hash-functions ( -- x num ) {
        int i;
        unsigned x, num;

        x = 0;
        num = 0;
        for (i = br_sha1_ID; i <= br_sha512_ID; i ++) {
                if (br_multihash_getimpl(&ENG->mhash, i)) {
                        x |= 1U << i;
                        num ++;
                }
        }
        T0_PUSH(x);
        T0_PUSH(num);
}

\ (Re)initialise the multihasher.
cc: multihash-init ( -- ) {
        br_multihash_init(&ENG->mhash);
}

\ Flush the current record: if some payload data has been accumulated,
\ close the record and schedule it for sending. If there is no such data,
\ this function does nothing.
cc: flush-record ( -- ) {
        br_ssl_engine_flush_record(ENG);
}

\ Yield control to the caller.
\ When the control is returned to us, react to the new context. Returned
\ value is a bitwise combination of the following:
\   0x01   handshake data is available
\   0x02   change-cipher-spec data is available
\   0x04   some data other than handshake or change-cipher-spec is available
\   0x08   output buffer is ready for a new outgoing record
\   0x10   renegotiation is requested and not to be ignored
\ Flags 0x01, 0x02 and 0x04 are mutually exclusive.
: wait-co ( -- state )
        co
        0
        addr-action get8 dup if
                case
                        1 of 0 do-close endof
                        2 of addr-application_data get8 if 0x10 or then endof
                endcase
        else
                drop
        then
        addr-close_received get8 ifnot
                has-input? if
                        addr-record_type_in get8 case

                                \ ChangeCipherSpec
                                20 of 0x02 or endof

                                \ Alert -- if close_notify received, trigger
                                \ the closure sequence.
                                21 of process-alerts if -1 do-close then endof

                                \ Handshake
                                22 of 0x01 or endof

                                \ Not CCS, Alert or Handshake.
                                drop 0x04 or 0
                        endcase
                then
        then
        can-output? if 0x08 or then ;

\ Send an alert message. This shall be called only when there is room for
\ an outgoing record.
: send-alert ( level alert -- )
        21 addr-record_type_out set8
        swap write8-native drop write8-native drop
        flush-record ;

\ Send an alert message of level "warning". This shall be called only when
\ there is room for an outgoing record.
: send-warning ( alert -- )
        1 swap send-alert ;

\ Fail by sending a fatal alert.
: fail-alert ( alert -- ! )
        { alert }
        flush-record
        begin can-output? not while wait-co drop repeat
        2 alert send-alert
        begin can-output? not while wait-co drop repeat
        alert 512 + fail ;

\ Perform the close operation:
\ -- Prevent new application data from the caller.
\ -- Incoming data is discarded (except alerts).
\ -- Outgoing data is flushed.
\ -- A close_notify alert is sent.
\ -- If 'cnr' is zero, then incoming data is discarded until a close_notify
\    is received.
\ -- At the end, the context is terminated.
: do-close ( cnr -- ! )
        \ 'cnr' is set to non-zero when a close_notify is received from
        \ the peer.
        { cnr }

        \ Get out of application data state.
        0 addr-application_data set8

        \ Flush existing payload if any.
        flush-record

        \ Wait for room to send the close_notify. Since individual records
        \ can always hold at least 512 bytes, we know that when there is
        \ room, then there is room for a complete close_notify (two bytes).
        begin can-output? not while cnr wait-for-close >cnr repeat

        \ Write the close_notify and flush it.
        \ 21 addr-record_type_out set8
        \ 1 write8-native 0 write8-native 2drop
        \ flush-record
        0 send-warning

        \ Loop until our record has been sent (we know it's gone when
        \ writing is again possible) and a close_notify has been received.
        cnr
        begin
                dup can-output? and if ERR_OK fail then
                wait-for-close
        again ;

\ Yield control to the engine, with a possible flush. If 'cnr' is 0,
\ then input is analysed: all input is discarded, until a close_notify
\ is received.
: wait-for-close ( cnr -- cnr )
        co
        dup ifnot
                has-input? if
                        addr-record_type_in get8 21 = if
                                drop process-alerts
                        else
                                discard-input
                        then
                then
        then ;

\ Test whether there is some accumulated payload that still needs to be
\ sent.
cc: payload-to-send? ( -- bool ) {
        T0_PUSHi(-br_ssl_engine_has_pld_to_send(ENG));
}

\ Test whether there is some available input data.
cc: has-input? ( -- bool ) {
        T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_in != 0));
}

\ Test whether some payload bytes may be written.
cc: can-output? ( -- bool ) {
        T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_out > 0));
}

\ Discard current input entirely.
cc: discard-input ( -- ) {
        ENG->hlen_in = 0;
}

\ Low-level read for one byte. If there is no available byte right
\ away, then -1 is returned. Otherwise, the byte value is returned.
\ If the current record type is "handshake" then the read byte is also
\ injected in the multi-hasher.
cc: read8-native ( -- x ) {
        if (ENG->hlen_in > 0) {
                unsigned char x;

                x = *ENG->hbuf_in ++;
                if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
                        br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
                }
                T0_PUSH(x);
                ENG->hlen_in --;
        } else {
                T0_PUSHi(-1);
        }
}

\ Low-level read for several bytes. On entry, this expects an address
\ (offset in the engine context) and a length; these values designate
\ where the chunk should go. Upon exit, the new address and length
\ are pushed; that output length contains how many bytes could not be
\ read. If there is no available byte for reading, the address and
\ length are unchanged.
\ If the current record type is "handshake" then the read bytes are
\ injected in the multi-hasher.
cc: read-chunk-native ( addr len -- addr len ) {
        size_t clen = ENG->hlen_in;
        if (clen > 0) {
                uint32_t addr, len;

                len = T0_POP();
                addr = T0_POP();
                if ((size_t)len < clen) {
                        clen = (size_t)len;
                }
                memcpy((unsigned char *)ENG + addr, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
                if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
                        br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
                }
                T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
                T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
                ENG->hbuf_in += clen;
                ENG->hlen_in -= clen;
        }
}

\ Process available alert bytes. If a fatal alert is received, then the
\ context is terminated; otherwise, this returns either true (-1) if a
\ close_notify was received, false (0) otherwise.
: process-alerts ( -- bool )
        0
        begin has-input? while read8-native process-alert-byte or repeat
        dup if 1 addr-shutdown_recv set8 then ;

\ Process an alert byte. Returned value is non-zero if this is a close_notify,
\ zero otherwise.
: process-alert-byte ( x -- bool )
        addr-alert get8 case
                0 of
                        \ 'alert' field is 0, so this byte shall be a level.
                        \ Levels shall be 1 (warning) or 2 (fatal); we convert
                        \ all other values to "fatal".
                        dup 1 <> if drop 2 then
                        addr-alert set8 0
                endof
                1 of
                        0 addr-alert set8
                        \ close_notify has value 0.
                        \ no_renegotiation has value 100, and we treat it
                        \ as a fatal alert.
                        dup 100 = if 256 + fail then
                        0= ret
                endof
                \ Fatal alert implies context termination.
                drop 256 + fail
        endcase ;

\ In general we only deal with handshake data here. Alerts are processed
\ in specific code right when they are received, and ChangeCipherSpec has
\ its own handling code. So we need to check that the data is "handshake"
\ only when returning from a coroutine call.

\ Yield control to the engine. Alerts are processed; if incoming data is
\ neither handshake or alert, then an error is triggered.
: wait-for-handshake ( -- )
        wait-co 0x07 and 0x01 > if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then ;

\ Flush outgoing data (if any), then wait for the output buffer to be
\ clear; when this is done, set the output record type to the specified
\ value.
: wait-rectype-out ( rectype -- )
        { rectype }
        flush-record
        begin
                can-output? if rectype addr-record_type_out set8 ret then
                wait-co drop
        again ;

\ Read one byte of handshake data. Block until that byte is available.
\ This does not check any length.
: read8-nc ( -- x )
        begin
                read8-native dup 0< ifnot ret then
                drop wait-for-handshake
        again ;

\ Test whether there are some more bytes in the current record. These
\ bytes have not necessarily been received yet (processing of unencrypted
\ records may begin before all bytes are received).
cc: more-incoming-bytes? ( -- bool ) {
        T0_PUSHi(ENG->hlen_in != 0 || !br_ssl_engine_recvrec_finished(ENG));
}

\ For reading functions, the TOS is supposed to contain the number of bytes
\ that can still be read (from encapsulating structure header), and it is
\ updated.

: check-len ( lim len -- lim )
        - dup 0< if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then ;

\ Read one byte of handshake data. This pushes an integer in the 0..255 range.
: read8 ( lim -- lim x )
        1 check-len read8-nc ;

\ Read a 16-bit value (in the 0..65535 range)
: read16 ( lim -- lim n )
        2 check-len read8-nc 8 << read8-nc + ;

\ Read a 24-bit value (in the 0..16777215 range)
: read24 ( lim -- lim n )
        3 check-len read8-nc 8 << read8-nc + 8 << read8-nc + ;

\ Read some bytes. The "address" is an offset within the context
\ structure.
: read-blob ( lim addr len -- lim )
        { addr len }
        len check-len
        addr len
        begin
                read-chunk-native
                dup 0 = if 2drop ret then
                wait-for-handshake
        again ;

\ Read some bytes and drop them.
: skip-blob ( lim len -- lim )
        swap over check-len swap
        begin dup while read8-nc drop 1- repeat
        drop ;

\ Read a 16-bit length, then skip exactly that many bytes.
: read-ignore-16 ( lim -- lim )
        read16 skip-blob ;

\ Open a substructure: the inner structure length is checked against,
\ and substracted, from the output structure current limit.
: open-elt ( lim len -- lim-outer lim-inner )
        dup { len }
        - dup 0< if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then
        len ;

\ Close the current structure. This checks that the limit is 0.
: close-elt ( lim -- )
        if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then ;

\ Write one byte of handshake data.
: write8 ( n -- )
        begin
                dup write8-native if drop ret then
                wait-co drop
        again ;

\ Low-level write for one byte. On exit, it pushes either -1 (byte was
\ written) or 0 (no room in output buffer).
cc: write8-native ( x -- bool ) {
        unsigned char x;

        x = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
        if (ENG->hlen_out > 0) {
                if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
                        br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
                }
                *ENG->hbuf_out ++ = x;
                ENG->hlen_out --;
                T0_PUSHi(-1);
        } else {
                T0_PUSHi(0);
        }
}

\ Write a 16-bit value.
: write16 ( n -- )
        dup 8 u>> write8 write8 ;

\ Write a 24-bit value.
: write24 ( n -- )
        dup 16 u>> write8 write16 ;

\ Write some bytes. The "address" is an offset within the context
\ structure.
: write-blob ( addr len -- )
        begin
                write-blob-chunk
                dup 0 = if 2drop ret then
                wait-co drop
        again ;

cc: write-blob-chunk ( addr len -- addr len ) {
        size_t clen = ENG->hlen_out;
        if (clen > 0) {
                uint32_t addr, len;

                len = T0_POP();
                addr = T0_POP();
                if ((size_t)len < clen) {
                        clen = (size_t)len;
                }
                memcpy(ENG->hbuf_out, (unsigned char *)ENG + addr, clen);
                if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
                        br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_out, clen);
                }
                T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
                T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
                ENG->hbuf_out += clen;
                ENG->hlen_out -= clen;
        }
}

\ Write a blob with the length as header (over one byte)
: write-blob-head8 ( addr len -- )
        dup write8 write-blob ;

\ Write a blob with the length as header (over two bytes)
: write-blob-head16 ( addr len -- )
        dup write16 write-blob ;

\ Perform a byte-to-byte comparison between two blobs. Each blob is
\ provided as an "address" (offset in the context structure); the
\ length is common. Returned value is true (-1) if the two blobs are
\ equal, false (0) otherwise.
cc: memcmp ( addr1 addr2 len -- bool ) {
        size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
        void *addr2 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        void *addr1 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        int x = memcmp(addr1, addr2, len);
        T0_PUSH((uint32_t)-(x == 0));
}

\ Copy bytes between two areas, whose addresses are provided as
\ offsets in the context structure.
cc: memcpy ( dst src len -- ) {
        size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
        void *src = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        void *dst = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        memcpy(dst, src, len);
}

\ Get string length (zero-terminated). The string address is provided as
\ an offset relative to the context start. Returned length does not include
\ the terminated 0.
cc: strlen ( str -- len ) {
        void *str = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        T0_PUSH((uint32_t)strlen(str));
}

\ Fill a buffer with zeros. The buffer address is an offset in the context.
cc: bzero ( addr len -- ) {
        size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
        void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        memset(addr, 0, len);
}

\ Scan the list of supported cipher suites for a given value. If found,
\ then the list index at which it was found is returned; otherwise, -1
\ is returned.
: scan-suite ( suite -- index )
        { suite }
        addr-suites_num get8 { num }
        0
        begin dup num < while
                dup 1 << addr-suites_buf + get16 suite = if ret then
                1+
        repeat
        drop -1 ;

\ =======================================================================

\ Generate random bytes into buffer (address is offset in context).
cc: mkrand ( addr len -- ) {
        size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
        void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
        br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ENG->rng, addr, len);
}

\ Read a handshake message header: type and length. These are returned
\ in reverse order (type is TOS, length is below it).
: read-handshake-header-core ( -- lim type )
        read8-nc 3 read24 swap drop swap ;

\ Read a handshake message header: type and length. If the header is for
\ a HelloRequest message, then it is discarded and a new header is read
\ (repeatedly if necessary).
: read-handshake-header ( -- lim type )
        begin
                read-handshake-header-core dup 0= while
                drop if ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE fail then
        repeat ;

\ =======================================================================

\ Cipher suite processing.
\
\ Unfortunately, cipher suite identifiers are attributed mostly arbitrary,
\ so we have to map the cipher suite numbers we support into aggregate
\ words that encode the information we need. Table below is organized
\ as a sequence of pairs of 16-bit words, the first being the cipher suite
\ identifier, the second encoding the algorithm elements. The suites are
\ ordered by increasing cipher suite ID, so that fast lookups may be
\ performed with a binary search (not implemented for the moment, since it
\ does not appear to matter much in practice).
\
\ Algorithm elements are encoded over 4 bits each, in the following order
\ (most significant to least significant):
\ 
\ -- Server key type:
\       0  RSA           (RSA key exchange)
\       1  ECDHE-RSA     (ECDHE key exchange, RSA signature)
\       2  ECDHE-ECDSA   (ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA signature)
\       3  ECDH-RSA      (ECDH key exchange, certificate is RSA-signed)
\       4  ECDH-ECDSA    (ECDH key exchange, certificate is ECDSA-signed)
\ -- Encryption algorithm:
\       0  3DES/CBC
\       1  AES-128/CBC
\       2  AES-256/CBC
\       3  AES-128/GCM
\       4  AES-256/GCM
\       5  ChaCha20/Poly1305
\ -- MAC algorithm:
\       0  none         (for suites with AEAD encryption)
\       2  HMAC/SHA-1
\       4  HMAC/SHA-256
\       5  HMAC/SHA-384
\ -- PRF for TLS-1.2:
\       4  with SHA-256
\       5  with SHA-384

data: cipher-suite-def

hexb| 000A 0024 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
hexb| 002F 0124 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
hexb| 0035 0224 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
hexb| 003C 0144 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
hexb| 003D 0244 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256

hexb| 009C 0304 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
hexb| 009D 0405 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

hexb| C003 4024 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
hexb| C004 4124 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
hexb| C005 4224 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
hexb| C008 2024 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
hexb| C009 2124 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
hexb| C00A 2224 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
hexb| C00D 3024 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
hexb| C00E 3124 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
hexb| C00F 3224 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
hexb| C012 1024 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
hexb| C013 1124 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
hexb| C014 1224 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

hexb| C023 2144 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
hexb| C024 2255 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
hexb| C025 4144 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
hexb| C026 4255 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
hexb| C027 1144 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
hexb| C028 1255 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
hexb| C029 3144 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
hexb| C02A 3255 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
hexb| C02B 2304 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
hexb| C02C 2405 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
hexb| C02D 4304 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
hexb| C02E 4405 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
hexb| C02F 1304 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
hexb| C030 1405 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
hexb| C031 3304 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
hexb| C032 3405 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

hexb| CCA8 1504 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
hexb| CCA9 2504 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

hexb| 0000 | \ List terminator.

\ Convert cipher suite identifier to element words. This returns 0 if
\ the cipher suite is not known.
: cipher-suite-to-elements ( suite -- elts )
        { id }
        cipher-suite-def
        begin
                dup 2+ swap data-get16
                dup ifnot 2drop 0 ret then
                id = if data-get16 ret then
                2+
        again ;

\ Check that a given cipher suite is supported. Note that this also
\ returns true (-1) for the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV pseudo-ciphersuite.
: suite-supported? ( suite -- bool )
        dup 0x5600 = if drop -1 ret then
        cipher-suite-to-elements 0<> ;

\ Get expected key type for cipher suite. The key type is one of
\ BR_KEYTYPE_RSA or BR_KEYTYPE_EC, combined with either BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX
\ (RSA encryption or static ECDH) or BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN (RSA or ECDSA
\ signature, for ECDHE cipher suites).
: expected-key-type ( suite -- key-type )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >>
        case
                0 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_RSA | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX } endof
                1 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_RSA | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } endof
                2 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC  | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } endof
                3 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC  | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX } endof
                4 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC  | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX } endof
                0 swap
        endcase ;

\ Test whether the cipher suite uses RSA key exchange.
: use-rsa-keyx? ( suite -- bool )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 0= ;

\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDHE key exchange, signed with RSA.
: use-rsa-ecdhe? ( suite -- bool )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 1 = ;

\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDHE key exchange, signed with ECDSA.
: use-ecdsa-ecdhe? ( suite -- bool )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 2 = ;

\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDHE key exchange (with RSA or ECDSA).
: use-ecdhe? ( suite -- bool )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> dup 0> swap 3 < and ;

\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDH (static) key exchange.
: use-ecdh? ( suite -- bool )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 2 > ;

\ Get identifier for the PRF (TLS 1.2).
: prf-id ( suite -- id )
        cipher-suite-to-elements 15 and ;

\ Switch to negotiated security parameters for input or output.
: switch-encryption ( is-client for-input -- )
        { for-input }
        addr-cipher_suite get16 cipher-suite-to-elements { elts }

        \ prf_id
        elts 15 and

        \ mac_id
        elts 4 >> 15 and

        \ cipher type and key length
        elts 8 >> 15 and case
                \ 3DES/CBC
                0 of 0 24
                        for-input if
                                switch-cbc-in
                        else
                                switch-cbc-out
                        then
                endof

                \ AES-128/CBC
                1 of 1 16
                        for-input if
                                switch-cbc-in
                        else
                                switch-cbc-out
                        then
                endof

                \ AES-256/CBC
                2 of 1 32
                        for-input if
                                switch-cbc-in
                        else
                                switch-cbc-out
                        then
                endof

                \ AES-128/GCM
                3 of drop 16
                        for-input if
                                switch-aesgcm-in
                        else
                                switch-aesgcm-out
                        then
                endof

                \ AES-256/GCM
                4 of drop 32
                        for-input if
                                switch-aesgcm-in
                        else
                                switch-aesgcm-out
                        then
                endof

                \ ChaCha20/Poly1305
                \ 5 of endof

                ERR_BAD_PARAM fail
        endcase
        ;

cc: switch-cbc-out ( is_client prf_id mac_id aes cipher_key_len -- ) {
        int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
        unsigned cipher_key_len;

        cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
        aes = T0_POP();
        mac_id = T0_POP();
        prf_id = T0_POP();
        is_client = T0_POP();
        br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
                aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcenc : ENG->ides_cbcenc, cipher_key_len);
}

cc: switch-cbc-in ( is_client prf_id mac_id aes cipher_key_len -- ) {
        int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
        unsigned cipher_key_len;

        cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
        aes = T0_POP();
        mac_id = T0_POP();
        prf_id = T0_POP();
        is_client = T0_POP();
        br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
                aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcdec : ENG->ides_cbcdec, cipher_key_len);
}

cc: switch-aesgcm-out ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len -- ) {
        int is_client, prf_id;
        unsigned cipher_key_len;

        cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
        prf_id = T0_POP();
        is_client = T0_POP();
        br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
                ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
}

cc: switch-aesgcm-in ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len -- ) {
        int is_client, prf_id;
        unsigned cipher_key_len;

        cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
        prf_id = T0_POP();
        is_client = T0_POP();
        br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
                ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
}

\ Write Finished message.
: write-Finished ( from_client -- )
        compute-Finished
        20 write8 12 write24 addr-pad 12 write-blob ;

\ Read Finished message.
: read-Finished ( from_client -- )
        compute-Finished
        read-handshake-header 20 <> if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
        addr-pad 12 + 12 read-blob
        close-elt
        addr-pad dup 12 + 12 memcmp ifnot ERR_BAD_FINISHED fail then ;

\ Compute the "Finished" contents (either the value to send, or the
\ expected value). The 12-byte string is written in the pad. The
\ "from_client" value is non-zero for the Finished sent by the client.
\ The computed value is also saved in the relevant buffer for handling
\ secure renegotiation.
: compute-Finished ( from_client -- )
        dup addr-saved_finished swap ifnot 12 + then swap
        addr-cipher_suite get16 prf-id compute-Finished-inner
        addr-pad 12 memcpy ;

cc: compute-Finished-inner ( from_client prf_id -- ) {
        int prf_id = T0_POP();
        int from_client = T0_POPi();
        unsigned char seed[48];
        size_t seed_len;

        br_tls_prf_impl prf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(ENG, prf_id);
        if (ENG->session.version >= BR_TLS12) {
                seed_len = br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, prf_id, seed);
        } else {
                br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_md5_ID, seed);
                br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_sha1_ID, seed + 16);
                seed_len = 36;
        }
        prf(ENG->pad, 12, ENG->session.master_secret,
                sizeof ENG->session.master_secret,
                from_client ? "client finished" : "server finished",
                seed, seed_len);
}

\ Receive ChangeCipherSpec and Finished from the peer.
: read-CCS-Finished ( is-client -- )
        has-input? if
                addr-record_type_in get8 20 <> if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
        else
                begin
                        wait-co 0x07 and dup 0x02 <> while
                        if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
                repeat
                drop
        then
        read8-nc 1 <> more-incoming-bytes? or if ERR_BAD_CCS fail then
        dup 1 switch-encryption

        \ Read and verify Finished from peer.
        not read-Finished ;

\ Send ChangeCipherSpec and Finished to the peer.
: write-CCS-Finished ( is-client -- )
        \ Flush and wait for output buffer to be clear, so that we may
        \ write our ChangeCipherSpec. We must switch immediately after
        \ triggering the flush.
        20 wait-rectype-out
        1 write8
        flush-record
        dup 0 switch-encryption
        22 wait-rectype-out
        write-Finished
        flush-record ;